Opinion: School safety drills alone won’t prevent shootings. We must assess our vulnerabilities.
Thomas McWeeney, Stephanie F. Dailey, Dale Watson
Op-Ed from The San Diego-Union-Tribune
November, 2023
Over the past 25 years, $3 billion has been spent to address school shootings in the United States, an investment that has brought enhanced physical security to many of the nation’s schools. By almost every measure, American schools are much safer than 20 years ago.
Yet, in the last three years, we have witnessed a surge in school shootings marked by the loss of innocent children — surpassing any other three-year period since the shootings at Columbine High School in 1999. In 2022 alone, there were 51 incidents resulting in 40 deaths. This suggests that existing approaches are not working.
In nearly half of America’s 10 most fatal shootings, the school recently completed in-depth security programs with consultants, equipment, active shooter exercises and staff training.
Consider the preparation undertaken by Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, just a few months before the May 2022 shooting — one of the deadliest school shootings in U.S. history. The school and school district implemented extensive security measures — including a security plan for mass casualty events. The school conducted training exercises with the Uvalde Police and Sheriff’s Departments and other law enforcement agencies. In March, just two months before the shooting, the school hosted an active shooter training exercise.
School districts highlight the numerous enhancements to bolster security, such as improvements in visitor management, surveillance, shot detection, mass communications and weapons detection technology. Additionally, they emphasize various processes and procedures, including anti-bullying programs, anonymous reporting systems, emergency plans, active shooter protocols and behavioral threat assessment teams.
Despite these efforts, the issue of school shootings continues to loom. Guy Bliesner, writing in an edition of Campus Safety, argues that these enhancements alone are insufficient in ensuring school safety. He notes that, ultimately, only the collective efforts of the people within a school community can safeguard our educational institutions.
Bliesner’s point is underscored in a report by the Texas legislature in the aftermath of Uvalde. The report presented by a Texas House of Representatives committee found the school’s security program ineffective, and it concluded the school had a “culture of non-compliance,” which limited new security capabilities. It appears that increases in safety equipment and security may create a false sense of confidence, limiting the ability to see vulnerabilities until it is too late.
If there is an answer, it hinges on the capacity of local school administrators, teachers, parents and the entire school community to evaluate vulnerabilities within their institution. Only they can pinpoint security weaknesses that may be easily exploited, and only they can take meaningful and ongoing corrective measures. To end the pain of the past two decades, fully engaged school communities must set aside the urge to elucidate past actions and channel their efforts into recognizing and committing to addressing what still needs to be done.
A vulnerability self-assessment, distinct from a threat assessment, is viewed from the perspective of a prospective shooter and can make a significant contribution to the safety and security of all schools. Whereas a threat assessment identifies the need to upgrade physical security or enhance a mental health program, a vulnerability assessment would specifically address unlocked doors, unmanned security posts, poor information sharing or the inability to monitor children exhibiting warning signs. A review of the 389 school shootings that have taken place since 1999 reveals the most significant weaknesses are not in the security apparatus itself but in the extent to which it is being effectively implemented. Unfortunately, few schools use on-site staff to conduct candid and in-depth vulnerability assessments. Such assessments, conducted at the individual school level, would identify (and correct) those immediate lapses in the school’s practices, policies and procedures that potential shooters can readily exploit.
We can wait for gun control and the removal of the 393 million civilian-owned guns in the United States, or we can wait for the emergence of a kinder, gentler humanity. On the other hand, an on-site school leadership team consisting of school administrators, staff, teachers and parents that engage in real-time vulnerability self-assessments, followed by immediate corrective action (where possible), can avert the devastation associated with each shooting. The California State University team, in connection with George Mason University, offers individualized vulnerability self-assessments on a limited basis to individual schools free of charge and will offer training to school districts interested in the development of an ongoing program. This is a unique opportunity to collaborate with all interested parties to ensure safety within our schools.
Stopping School Shootings: Whose Job Is It?
Thomas McWeeney, Director
Institute for Public Management and Governance
January, 2023
For the past several years, I have been advocating the use of a prevention model for the school shooting problem that is very similar to the one I helped develop and implemented for the FBI. Though the model has evolved greatly since it was first presented to the FBI Director, it set in motion a proactive approach to counterterrorism that has enabled the FBI to prevent a recurrence of the horrific events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
I strongly believe that the model can be a useful tool in preventing school shootings. The model and approach require an honest assessment, by school officials and employees, of all the vulnerabilities in each school, a public sharing of that assessment, and a commitment to use all available resources to address every known vulnerability. But after three years of discussing this approach with several school district officials, briefing the approach to a national and international law enforcement conference, and seeking to gain support from national and local foundations, we realized that solving this problem will take a kind of moral and intellectual courage on the part of our public officials that appears to be in short supply today.
Though it may be difficult for those not directly engaged in the issue to understand, creating a fortress around each of the 360,000 schools in the United States – even if feasible – is not the answer. As was the case with terrorism, there are two things that must be kept in mind. First, as horrific as the shootings have been, there continues to be a very low likelihood that YOUR school will be the next victim. I refer to this as a “low probability, high consequence” problem -- one in which the likelihood of the dreaded incident occurring at YOUR school is very low, but if it does occur, the consequences would be unthinkable. Strategies to address this type of problem require a sustained effort and a total commitment of all concerned. But maintaining a sustained effort in the face of a threat that is unlikely to materialize is a very difficult challenge for most of us.
The second issue that links the solutions that worked for the terrorism threat to potential solutions to the school shooting threat is the need to be totally candid about the nature of the threat and our current vulnerability. The more intangible vulnerabilities, such as inadequate intelligence, poor communication, unreliable partnerships, and the inability to continually monitor and improve these vulnerabilities, were found to be among the most significant FBI vulnerabilities prior to 9/11. Only after the 9/11 attacks were these vulnerabilities acknowledged and addressed by the FBI. Similarly, we presume that the schools which have been recently attacked are now finding ways to address these and other vulnerabilities.
Over the past few years, we have spoken with several school employees that identified similar unaddressed issues. While school districts have spent millions of dollars improving physical security and installing expensive technical systems, the horror continues. Several initiatives that would reduce the likelihood of such tragedies continue to be only minimally addressed. The causes of the tragedies surprise no one: a disturbed young man whose troubles were widely known, the lack of sufficient mental health support, the ease with which guns can be taken inside the school, the inattention of school officials, and the inability to collect and process available intelligence that may be relevant to the shooter’s home, from people who knew the shooter, and/or from people in the larger community. These vulnerabilities make the exclusive reliance on “hardening” the school buildings extremely foolhardy. The starting point in addressing vulnerabilities is a frank discussion...
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Data and Letters:
Mass Casualty K-12 School Shootings Data from 1999-2022
Mass Casualty Data Report.pdf
Desert Sun OP-ED from May 2023
"Coachella Valley schools should work to prevent shootings with safety 'self-
assessments'"
Desert Sun OP-ED from March 2023
"Message to CVUSD: Preventing shootings requires ‘self-assessments’"